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While prior empirical work and much public attention have focused on the opportunistic timing of
executives' grants, we provide in this paper evidence that outside directors' option grants have also
been favorably timed to an extent that cannot be fully explained by sheer luck. Examining events in
which public firms granted options to outside directors during 1996-2005, we find that 9% were "lucky
grant events" falling on days with a stock price equal to a monthly low. We estimate that about 800
lucky grant events owed their status to opportunistic timing, and that about 460 firms and 1400 outside
directors were associated with grant events produced by such timing. There is evidence that the opportunistic
timing of director grant events has been to a substantial extent the product of backdating and not merely
spring-loading based on private information. We find that directors' luck has been correlated with
executives' luck. Furthermore, grant events were more likely to be lucky when the firm had more entrenching
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The opportunistic timing of executive stock option grants -- via backdating, spring-
loading based on the use of private information, or otherwise – has been the subject of significant 
empirical work and a great deal of public attention. But it has not been thus far recognized that 
grants awarded to outside directors have also been opportunistically timed. This paper shows that 
opportunistic timing problems have not been limited to executives’ grants, as has been thus far 
assumed, but rather have also affected outside directors’ grants. The paper investigates the link 
between executives' and directors' luck, and it identifies governance and other factors associated 
with opportunistic timing of director grants. Our findings contribute to understanding the scope 
of opportunistic timing practices and are relevant for attempts to understand their underlying 
causes. More generally, by highlighting the potential existence and determinants of agency 
problems between directors and shareholders, our analysis contributes to assessing outside 
directors' role and identifying governance arrangements that could improve directors' 
performance.  
  Financial economists' empirical work is widely regarded as responsible for drawing 
attention to the abnormal returns accompanying executives' option grants. More recently, the 
realization that many executive grants have been backdated has led to a wave of corporate 
scandals. The Senate Banking and Finance committees held hearings on the subject, and the SEC 
and a small army of private law firms hired by companies are investigating past grant practices. 
More than 120 companies have come under scrutiny as of this writing. Dozens of executives 
have been forced to resign, and dozens of companies announced that they will have to restate 
their past financial statements.
1   
The alleged backdating of executives' grants has raised questions regarding the role if any 
played by outside directors. In his opening statement at the Senate Finance hearing on 
backdating, Chairman Grassley expressed concerns that "boards of directors were either asleep at 
                                                 
1   The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) maintains an "Options Scorecard" at www.wsj.com with an updated list 
of all the companies that have come under scrutiny in connection with backdating issues, and it counted 
more than 120 such companies as of this writing. For an account of the large scale of investigations of 
past grants conducted by companies with the help of hired outside professionals, see James Bandler and 
Kara Scannell, "In Options Probes, Private Law Firms Play Crucial Role", Wall Street Journal, October 
28, 2006.  
1 the switch, or in some cases, willing accomplices themselves." 
2 In the view of Chairman 
Grassley, as in that of others who focused on the opportunistic timing of executive options, there 
were two possible scenarios that could raise concerns: first, the "asleep at the switch” scenario of 
directors not knowing about the opportunistic timing of executives' grants, which raises the 
question of whether directors should have commonly been expected to notice such practices;
3 
second, the "accomplice" scenario of outside directors knowing but electing to go along with the 
opportunistic timing of executives' grants, which raises questions about the directors' incentives 
and the adequacy of their performance as guardians of shareholder interests. Thus far, evidence 
that directors knew about the backdating of executives’ grants has surfaced only in a few cases.
4  
With attention focused on what role, if any, was played by directors in the opportunistic 
timing of grants awarded to executives, little attention was paid to the grants awarded to outside 
directors themselves. Practitioners with whom we discussed the subject told us that in their view, 
director grants have been unlikely targets for opportunistic timing because many of them 
coincide with the annual meeting and because the monetary stakes are substantially smaller than 
in executives' grants. Also, some of the possible reasons given by observers for the backdating of 
executives' options – such as a desire to provide executives with non-performance pay that is not 
subject to the limitations on tax deductibility of Section 162(m) of the Tax Code – are not 
                                                 
2 Opening Statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chairman, Finance Committee Hearing, “Executive 
Compensation: Backdating to the Future", Wednesday, Sept. 6, 2006, available at 
http://www.senate.gov/~finance/. 
3  Some observers believe that directors should not have been generally expected to know about the 
existence of opportunistic timing practices. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Deconstructing American Business II 
(Nov. 1, 2006) (expressing concern that business might be hurt by backdating investigations leading to 
criticism "not only of those at fault but all directors of the companies involved").  
4 According to the WSJ's options scorecard, among the more than 120 companies coming under scrutiny 
thus far and among the dozens of corporate officials forced to depart, outside directors departed or were 
alleged to have been directly involved only in a small number of cases, including United Health, Brooks 
Automation, and Mercury Interactive.  
2 applicable to outside directors' grants.
5 Whether for these reasons or others, little systematic 
attention has been thus far paid to the timing of outside directors' grants.
6  
We provide in this paper evidence that opportunistic timing has not been limited to 
executives’ grants but rather has been present in outside directors’ grants as well. This evidence 
helps to gain a fuller understanding of the scope of opportunistic timing practices. It is also 
relevant for any attempt to understand fully the causes of such practices, and the role if any that 
outside directors played in connection with these practices. 
Our findings could also have relevance beyond the grant timing context. Outside 
directors play a key role in the structure of public companies with dispersed ownership and are 
counted on to reduce executives' agency problems by monitoring, supervising, and setting 
executives' compensation. Increased reliance on outside directors has been advocated by many 
financial economists and legal scholars, and increasing the power and role of independent 
directors was a key element of the 2003 changes in stock exchange listing requirements. Our 
work highlights the possibility that agency costs might arise between outside directors and 
shareholders, and not only between executives and boards serving as shareholders’ guardians. 
Furthermore, our findings that certain governance arrangements have been correlated with 
opportunistic timing are relevant for identifying the conditions under which outside directors can 
perform their critical role better.  
The universe of director grants we study contains all the grants given to directors of the 
about 6,000 public companies in the Thompson database during the decade of 1996-2005. 
Among about 29,000 grant events during this period, about 9% were "lucky events” – defined as 
events taking place on days with the lowest stock price level of the month. When we exclude 
                                                 
5 This possibility was raised, for example, by WSJ columnist Holman Jenkins Jr. and by a WSJ editorial.  
See Jenkins, "Business World: The 'Backdating' Witch hunt," Wall Street Journal, June 21, 2006; 
"Backdating to the Future," October 12, 2006.  The possibility that backdating has been partly driven by 
section 162(m) of the Tax Code, which limited to $1 million the deduction that companies may take for 
the nonperformance compensation paid to any given executive, was one of the reasons leading the Senate 
Finance Committee to schedule hearings on backdating and the tax treatment of executive pay. 
6  We are aware of two companies -- Brooks Automation and Monster – where the company or the media 
reported about allegedly manipulated grants given to outside directors. See Charles Forelle and James 
Bandler, “Brooks Automation Cites ‘False’ Options Document,” Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2006; 
Charles Forelle and Mark Maremont, “Monster Worldwide Gave Officials Options Ahead of Share Run-
Ups,” Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2006. But we are unaware of any suggestion in the media or otherwise 
that there has been a significant incidence of opportunistic timing among director grants.  
3 events taking place at the time of the annual meeting (information about which we have for only 
some of the companies), the percentage of grant events that were lucky naturally goes up.   
Interestingly, we find a clear monotonic relation between how a trading day ranked 
within the price distribution of the month and the likelihood that the day happened to be selected 
for a grant event. A day was most likely to be chosen for a grant event if its stock price was at 
the lowest level, second most likely to be chosen if its price was at the second-lowest level, and 
third most likely to be chosen if its price was at the third-lowest level.  
Compared with a random selection of grant dates,
7 the excess incidence of grant events is 
concentrated at the lowest price of the month: that is, in the form of lucky grants. We estimate 
that about 800 lucky grant events owed their status to opportunistic timing rather than to mere 
luck. This opportunistic timing was spread over a significant number of firms. We estimate that 
about 460 firms (about 7% of all firms) were involved in opportunistically timed lucky events. 
Opportunistic timing of director grants has been more common before the adoption of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) but continued after the adoption of SOX.   
The opportunistic timing of directors' grants, we find, has not been limited to new 
economy firms or any other particular sector. Such practices appear to have been present in each 
of the economy's twelve industries (using the Fama-French classification) except for the utilities 
sector (in which director grants are infrequent anyway).  
As far as executives' grants are concerned, opportunistic timing based on spring-loading 
is often viewed as raising less severe concerns than timing based on backdating. It is far from 
clear, however, that those who view spring-loading of executives’ grants as acceptable would 
have the same attitude to directors’ grants. In any event, our analysis indicates that backdating, 
and not merely "spring-loading" based on the use of inside information, has been a major driver 
of the higher-than-random incidence of lucky events benefiting outside directors. Spring-loading 
is unlikely to enable differentiating between two stock prices that are very close to one another. 
We find, however, that a day with the lowest price of the month was substantially more likely to 
be selected for a grant event than a day with the second lowest level even when the difference 
between the two price levels is less than one percent. Of course, if the date of a grant event is set 
                                                 
7 By a random selection we refer not to assignment method that is strictly random but rather one in which 
grant dates are selected on the basis of factors that are independently distributed of price-rank 
considerations and thus should not be expected to produce over-concentration in low price-ranks.. 
4 when the whole distribution of stock prices is known, one could choose to take advantage even 
of such small differences in prices. 
Furthermore, spring-loading, which is based on information possessed by insiders at the 
time the grant is awarded, does not depend on the ability to delay reporting the grant. However, 
we find that directors’ grant events were significantly less likely to be lucky when they were 
reported in the same month as the one in which the grants took place, as well as after SOX, 
which imposed two-day reporting requirements which most but not all companies followed.   
We then turn to examine the characteristics of firms, grant circumstances, and 
governance arrangements that were correlated with lucky grant events. We find that lucky grant 
events were more likely when the potential payoffs from opportunistic timing are relatively high. 
Indeed, not only were lucky grant events more common in companies with a volatile stock price 
but also, for a given company with more than one grant event, the likelihood of an individual 
grant event being lucky increased when the gap between the lowest and the median price of the 
month of the grant event was higher. 
We identify a link between directors' and executives' luck. Although director grant events 
not coinciding with grants to executives were more often lucky than mere luck would predict, 
director grant events were more likely to be lucky when they did overlap with grants to 
executives of the firm, especially when they coincided with grants to the CEO. Furthermore, 
even events that did not overlap with grants to the CEO (or other executives) were more likely to 
be lucky when the CEO did receive a lucky grant in the current or preceding year. 
We also find that the occurrence of lucky grants was correlated with governance factors. 
In particular, grant events have been more likely to be lucky when the company had more 
entrenching provisions (weaker shareholder rights) protecting insiders from the risk of removal. 
Furthermore, grant events have been more likely to be lucky when the board did not have a 
majority of independent directors.  
  We further find that directors' luck has been persistent. Controlling for the various 
variables identified as being correlated with lucky grant events, we find that events were more 
likely to be lucky when the firm's preceding grant event was lucky as well. This result indicates 
that, in addition to these variables, there might well be other firm and director characteristics that 
made opportunistic timing more likely.  
5 Finally, while we focus on grant events that were favorably timed within a one-month 
period, we also explore possible opportunistic timing within longer periods. We find that there is 
an abnormally high incidence of super-lucky grant events – ones that took place on days with a 
stock price equal to the lowest in the calendar quarter or even the calendar year. 10% of grant 
events (11.7% before SOX) took place at one of the lowest three prices of the quarter, with 3.8% 
(4.6% before SOX) at a quarterly low. 2.8% of grant events (3.4% before SOX) took place at one 
of the three lowest prices of the year.     
Our work is related to several bodies of literature. To begin, it naturally relates to the 
literature on the opportunistic timing of executives' option grants – the seminal work by 
Yermack (1997), the subsequent work by Aboody and Kasznik (2000) and Chauvin and Shenoy 
(2001) and, beginning with the celebrated paper by Lie (2005), the more recent literature on 
opportunistic timing via backdating (e.g., Heron and Lie (2006a, b), Narayanan and Seyhun 
(2006a, b), Collins, Gong, and Li (2005), Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2006)).  This body of 
work focuses on option awards to executives, and, to the extent that it considered directors at all, 
it does so in connection with investigating why and when executives' grants were 
opportunistically timed.
8 In contrast, our focus is on grants to directors.  
In addition, our results on the association between lucky grant events and lack of majority 
of independent directors on the board contribute to the literature on the effects board 
independence. While empirical work has yielded mixed results regarding the relationship 
between the board independence and firm value in general (see Bhagat and Black, (1999), (2002) 
and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2006a)), board independence has been shown to have a 
significant impact on certain specific areas of corporate behavior.
9 Similarly, by showing that 
                                                 
8 Yermack (1997) discusses possible reasons why boards might have agreed to grant option to executives 
at points in time followed by stock price increases. Heron and Lie (2006b) consider whether executives' 
grants are more likely to be backdated when outside directors also get a grant at the same time but do not 
find such a connection. Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2006) show that CEOs are more likely to get 
grants at monthly lows when the board does not have a majority of independent directors. Bizjak, 
Lemmon, and Whitby (2006) report that executives are more likely to receive opportunistically timed 
grants when the firm's directors serve on the board of another company that was earlier involved in 
opportunistic timing of executive grants.     
9 See Byrd and Hickman (1992), Shivdasani (1993), Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994), Cotter, 
Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997), Dann, Del Guercio, and Partch (2003), Gillette, Noe, and Rebello (2003), 
Weisbach (1987), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2006b), Beasely 
(1996, 2000), and Dechow, Sloan and Sweeny (1996).   
6 lucky grants are correlated with high entrenchment levels, our study contributes to (and is 
consistent with) the studies finding that entrenchment and weak shareholder rights are associated 
with lower firm value as well as sub-optimal decisions on certain issues (see, e.g., Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003), Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004), and Masulis, Wang, and Xie 
(2006)).  
More generally, our analysis contributes to the general literature on the role of boards and 
outside directors. Some financial economists and legal scholars have long advocated increased 
reliance on outside directors who would suffer less from agency problems and could be expected 
to carry out well the board's oversight and supervisory role (see, e.g., Jensen (1993), Milstein and 
MacAvoy (1998)). As noted earlier, our results are relevant for understanding possible 
imperfections and agency costs of outside directors as well as identifying the arrangements and 
circumstances that can be expected to make them perform best. 
Before proceeding, we would like to note some limits on the scope of our analysis and 
the inferences that can be drawn from it. Because our analysis focuses on how director grant 
events ranked within the price distribution of the month in which the grant event took place, our 
analysis is not designed to and cannot capture fully instances of backdating based on small look-
back periods. Narayanan and Seyhun (2006b) show that,  during the post-SOX period, there have 
been likely many instances in which executives’ grants were mis-dated by just a few days, often 
by just one or two days. Thus, although our analysis focuses on the instances of opportunistic 
timing that likely produced the greatest relative increase in grants’ value, it does not cover all 
instances of opportunistic timing, and the estimates we provide for the incidence of opportunistic 
timing resulting in lucky grant events likely under-state the full incidence of opportunistic timing 
of director events.  
Furthermore, we wish to stress that or analysis does not show what role, if any, outside 
directors played in the opportunistic timing of their own grants. As has been the case with the 
earlier empirical findings concerning the opportunistic timing of executives’ options, showing 
that such timing occurred does not establish who was responsible for it, who knew about it, and 
what their state of mind was.
10 Furthermore, we wish to emphasize that, as is the case with CEO 
                                                 
10 Also, while our analysis can provide estimates concerning the aggregate number of lucky grants due to 
opportunistic timing, it cannot and does not attempt to establish whether any given lucky grant event 
owed its status to such timing. We therefore avoid mentioning in this paper any individual companies or 
outside directors associated with lucky grant events. 
7 grants due to opportunistic timing, most director grants have not been opportunistically timed, 
and most firms and directors have not been associated with such opportunistic timing.  
The remainder of our analysis is organized as follows. Section II describes our data and 
provides summary statistics. Section III examines the extent to which the incidence of lucky 
grant events has been affected by opportunistic timing, as well as the extent to which such 
opportunistic timing has partly resulted from backdating rather than the use of private 
information. Section IV investigates the relation between lucky grant events and firm 
characteristics, governance arrangements, and grant circumstances. Section V concludes.  
 
II. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
A. The Data  
We construct our dataset from Thomson Financial’s insider trading database, which 
includes all insiders’ filings of equity transactions in forms 3, 4, 5, and 144 between the years 
1996-2006. Following Heron and Lie (2006a, b) and Narayanan and Seyhun (2006b), we include 
in our dataset observations with a cleanse indicator of R (“data verified through the cleansing 
process”), H (“cleansed with a very high level of confidence”), or C (“a record added to 
nonderivative table or derivative table in order to correspond with a record on the opposing 
table”). We restrict our sample to grants to directors and to transactions that occurred before 
12/31/2005 (so that data about stock prices during the grant month is available in the 2005 CRSP 
database). We further require stock returns to be available for the entire month of the grant date. 
Because we focus on conventional at-the-money options, as does the literature on the 
opportunistic timing of executives' option grants, we check whether the strike price of the grant 
is close enough to the closing price of the grant date, or to the closing price of a day before or a 
day after the grant. A close enough price is defined as a price that is within 1% of the strike 
price. The date with the closest closing price to the strike price is then defined as the effective 
grant date.
11
                                                 
11  Consistent with Heron and Lie (2006a), we are also able to allocate the strike prices of about half of 
the grants in the sample. Heron and Lie discuss in detail the possible reasons for deviation from the strike 
price. We also eliminate grants that were given in months where the firm had an ex-dividend date; to the 
extent that firms schedule grants after an ex-dividend date, the grant price might fall below the stock 
prices preceding the ex-dividend date even in the absence of any backdating or spring-loading. 
8 Unlike other work on backdating, our focus is on grants to outside directors. The 
Thomson dataset allows grant recipient to report up to four different “roles” in the company. We 
admit into our sample only grants to individuals who identify themselves as directors (rolecode 
D) and do not identify themselves as having any other role in the company. To be conservative, 
we do not include grants to individuals that identify themselves as chair or vice-chair of the 
board.
12  
Our sample consists of 92,253 grants to 32,139 different directors. Directors of the same 
company often receive their grants on the same day. We therefore define our unit of observation 
as a grant event, which is a day in which one or more directors received option grants. Our 
sample consists of 28,764 director grant events. The average number of directors getting a grant 
in an event is 3.21. Our sample has 6,577 firms, consistent with the fact that many firms have 
two or more grant events.  
 
B. Summary Statistics 
In investigating the existence of abnormal patterns that could reflect opportunistic timing, 
we focus, as we did in our earlier work on CEO grants (Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2006)), 
on how the stock price of grant dates ranked within the price distribution of the calendar month 
of the grant. Table 1 shows the distribution of price-ranks for all the grant events in our sample.  
As the last two columns of the table indicate, there were more grants below than above 
the median price of the grant month. While 43.2% of the grant events have a strike price 
exceeding the median stock price of the month, 49.6% of the grant events have a strike price 
below the median: a difference of 6.4%. The distribution remains asymmetric, but to a lesser 
extent, in the period after the adoption of SOX.  
                                                 
12 As a check on the quality of our selection procedure, we use the subsample of grants (about a quarter of 
the grants in our sample) provided by firms for which data is available on the IRRC database. Of those 
grants which we classify as being given to outside directors using our selection procedure, only 0.74% are 
classified as being given to insiders using the IRRC classification. We further test whether the inclusion 
of a small number of potentially mis-classified directors has an effect on our results.  For the sample of 
IRRC firms, we study whether any of our results are affected by the use of the Thomson information or 
the IRRC information to select the sample of outside director grants. We find that both methods yield 
practically the same results throughout.  
 
9 Table 1 and Figure 1 also provide statistics about the percentage of grant events at precise 
price-ranks at the bottom and the top of the price distribution.  As both the table and the figure 
make clear, there is a monotonic relation between the rank of the price in a month and the 
percentage of grant events falling in that rank. For the full sample, the frequency of grant events 
is highest at the lowest price of the month (9.0%), second-highest at the second-lowest price of 
the month (7.6%), third-highest at the third-lowest price level (7.5%), and so forth. Conversely, 
the frequency of grants is lowest at the highest price level (5.9%), second-lowest at the second-
highest level (6.2%), and so forth. The difference between low- and high price-ranks is most 
pronounced during the pre-SOX period in which the percentage of lucky grant events at monthly 
lows was 10.2%. But low price-ranks remain more common than high price-ranks during the 
post-SOX period.  
Some firms provide grants to directors on the date of the annual shareholder meeting. 
These grants are scheduled in advance, and they thus cannot be expected to be the product of 
opportunistic timing. The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) database provides 
information on the annual meeting dates for a subset (about 25%) of the firms in our sample, and 
using it we are able to identify 2,555 grant events (about 9% of the total) that fell within +/- one 
day of the annual meeting. Panel B of Table 1 displays the distribution of grant events price 
ranks of these grant events. As we expected, panel B shows that, for grant events scheduled to 
coincide with the annual meeting, there are no significant differences between the fraction of 
grant events below and above the median of the grant month, as well as between the frequencies 
of low- and high-price ranks. The percentage of grant events at monthly lows is 4.4%, and the 
percentage of grant events at the highest price of the month is 4.4% as well. This symmetry 
characterizes both the pre-SOX and the post-SOX period.  
Panel C of Table 1 displays the distribution of price ranks after excluding the grant events 
we are able to identify as scheduled to coincide with the annual meeting.  The asymmetric 
pattern in this panel is more pronounced than the asymmetric pattern in the distribution of the 
whole sample. The frequency of grant events that are lucky increases to 10.9% for the pre-SOX 
period and to 9.4% for the whole period.  
Note that because our dataset enables identifying grants scheduled at the annual meeting 
only for a subset of the firms, the sample in Panel C is likely to contain a significant number of 
grant events coinciding with annual meeting dates. To explore this further, we take advantage of 
10 the fact that, among the IRRC firms for which we have data about the annual meeting date, over 
two-thirds hold their annual meetings in April or May. Panel D of Table 1 shows the distribution 
for the subsample where we do not have annual meeting dates and we exclude grant events in the 
months of April and May. The frequency of lucky grant events increases further to 12.0% for the 
pre-SOX period and to 10.1% for the overall period. Because this procedure also throws out 
some grant events that do not coincide with an annual meeting we do not use it going forward. 
However, it shows that, after excluding grant events on the annual meeting day (+/- 1 day), our 
sample still contains some events coinciding with the annual meeting which likely leads to an 
understatement of the frequency of lucky grant events among unscheduled events.  
Our sample contains many directors who received more than one grant, as well as many 
firms that have more than one grant event. Thus, one might wonder whether the grant events 
producing the asymmetry displayed in Table 1 are ones involving a relatively small number of 
directors and firms. To get a sense whether this is the case, Table 2 displays statistics about the 
distribution of grant prices across directors and firms.  
Table 2, panel A shows that 19.5% of directors (6,267 directors) participated in one or 
more lucky grant events at a monthly low, but only 14.9% (4,789 directors) participated in one or 
more grant events at the highest price of the month. Similarly, while 33.2% of directors (10,670 
directors) participated in one or more grant events at one of the two-lowest prices of the month, 
only 27.1% of directors (8,710 directors) participated in one or more grant events at one of the 
two-highest prices of the month. These figures indicate that the asymmetry between low and 
high price-ranks is not driven by a small number of directors.  
Table 2, panel B shows that the asymmetry between low and high price-ranks is also not 
due to a small number of firms producing among them a large number of lucky grants. While 
29.3% of firms (1,927 firms) had one or more lucky grant events at monthly lows, only 20.9% of 
firms (1,375 firms) had one or more events at the highest price of the month. Similarly, while 
46.5% of firms (3,058 firms) had one or more grant events at one of the two-lowest prices of the 
month, only 36.9% of the firms (2,427 firms) had one or more grant events at one of the two-
highest prices of the month. 
 
11 III. DIRECTORS' LUCK 
 
A.  Mere Luck? 
To evaluate whether and to what extent the selection of days to serve as grant event dates 
deviates from random, we run the following logit regression over all the days in each of the 
months in which a grant event was reported to have taken place:  
 
Is_Grantit =a0 + a1* Dummy_Three_lowest_pricesit + eit    (1) 
  
where Is_Grantit is a dummy variable that equals one if at date t firm i granted options to 
at least some of its directors and zero otherwise. Dummy_Three_lowest_pricesit is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the price at date t was one of the three lowest prices of the month and 
zero otherwise. We cluster the errors by firms. The clustering corrects for correlations in the 
error terms {eit} across grants that are given by the same company. Table 3, column 1 shows the 
results of the logit regression (1). The coefficient of the Dummy_Three_lowest_pricesit variable 
is 0.290. The coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1% level.  
Thus, for any given trading day during the grant month, having a stock price that is one 
of the three lowest prices of the month makes that day more likely to be selected as a grant event 
date. In a logit regression, the coefficients are the log of the odds that a date will be chosen as a 
grant date. Relative to the default of a day that is not among the three lowest, a day with a price 
among the three lowest prices of the month will have odds that are exp(0.290) = 1.34 times 
larger (that is, 34% higher) to be selected as a grant event date. 
Column 2 of Table 3 shows the results when we exclude the about 2,500 grant events we 
were able to identify as falling within +/- one day of the annual meeting. The coefficient of 
interest increases to 0.319, which indicates that, relative to the default of a day that is not among 
the three lowest prices of the month, a day with a price among the three lowest prices will have 
odds that are exp (0.319) = 1.37 times larger. 
Because SOX required reporting option grants within two days after the grant is given, 
backdating can be expected to have been less common after SOX. There is indeed evidence that 
the passage of SOX reduced the incidence of opportunistic timing of CEO grants (see, e.g., 
Heron and Lie (2006a), Narayanan and Seyhun (2006a)) and, in particular, the incidence of CEO 
12 grants placed at monthly lows by opportunistic timing (Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2006)). 
As Heron and Lie (2006a) and Narayanan and Seyhun (2006b) show, however, more than 20% 
of companies did not comply with the two-day filing requirement during the post-SOX period, 
and SOX therefore could not have eliminated backdating altogether. To take the difference 
between the pre- and post-SOX periods into account, we re-run regression (1) interacting the 
explanatory variables with dummies for whether the grant was given before SOX or after SOX.  
We present the results in column 3 of Table 3. The coefficient of the 
Dummy_Three_lowest_pricesit variable is 0.308 for the pre-SOX period and 0.253 for the post-
SOX period. Again, both coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% 
level. Thus, the results indicate that SOX did not bring an end to the higher-than-random 
selection of days at the bottom of the distribution.                         
A test of a difference between the two coefficients, however, indicates that the pre-SOX 
coefficient is higher (with 1% significance) than the post-SOX coefficient. This result is 
consistent with SOX reducing the incidences of opportunistic timing. Again, when we exclude 
grant events coinciding with the annual meeting, the coefficients become somewhat larger 
(column 4). 
 
B. The Monotonic Relation between Price Rank and Likelihood of Granting Options  
Having thus far lumped together the three lowest price levels, we now explore how the 
likelihood of an event grant is related to the precise ranking of that grant event. Specifically, we 
run the following regression: 
 
Is_Grantit =a0 + a1* Dummy_lowest_priceit  +     (2) 
 a2*Dummy_2
nd lowest_priceit +….+ a5* Dummy_5
th lowest priceit + eit
 
We again cluster the errors by firms. The clustering corrects for correlations in the error 
terms {eit} across grants that are given to the same CEO. We present the results in Table 4.  
The results in column 1 of Table 4 show a monotonic relation between the likelihood of a 
grant event falling on a particular date and the rank of the stock price of that date. The coefficient 
of the lowest price rank is higher than the coefficient of the second-lowest price, which in turn is 
higher than the coefficient of the third-lowest price, and so forth. We form a series of t-tests of 
13 differences between adjacent coefficients and reject the null of no differences. The results are 
also economically significant. For example, the coefficient on the Dummy_lowest_priceit is 
0.514, implying that if the date has the lowest price of the month, the odds of a grant event 
falling on that date increase by a factor of exp(0.514) = 1.67 (or by 67%).  
Column 2 of Table 4 shows the results where each of the coefficients in (2) is interacted 
with a dummy variable for whether the grant was given before or after SOX. Consistent with the 
results in Table 2, dates at the bottom of the distribution were each more likely to be selected 
before SOX than after SOX, though each of them still remained after SOX more likely to occur 
than under random assignment. Moreover, both before SOX and after SOX, the likelihood of 
selection went down monotonically from the highest to the lowest price of the month.  
 
C. Estimating the Incidence of Opportunistic Timing  
Having seen that the lowest three prices have been selected abnormally often, we now 
turn to estimate the number of grant events that have been opportunistically timed. For every 
price rank included in Table 1, we calculate the expected number of grant events with that price-
rank if grant events were assigned over the trading days during the grant month without regard to 
their price-rank.
13 This estimation is done by calculating for each individual grant event, 
assuming random assignment, the probability of being granted at the specific price-rank, and 
then aggregating these probabilities across all grant events. Because of the large number of grant 
events involved, a random assignment is highly unlikely to deviate significantly from the 
expected number we calculate.  
The difference between the actual number of grant events and the expected number in 
any price-rank provides our estimate for the number of grant events that were opportunistically 
timed. Table 5 shows our estimation results. We estimate that over the full sample period of 
1996-2005, 804 lucky grant events – 32.5% of all lucky grant events – owed their low price-rank 
to opportunistic timing. The percentage of lucky grant events that were due to opportunistic 
timing was 35.7% before SOX and 25.4% afterwards.  
                                                 
13 The scenario of random assignment also assumes that, after the day is randomly selected, the 
distribution of prices among the month's different days is not manipulated or affected by the choice of 
grant date. The probability of a day being the lowest-price day is computed by the ratio of the number of 
days in the grant month that have the lowest price to the number of trading days in that firm’s stock 
during the grant month. 
14 We find a smaller incidence of opportunistic timing among grant events with the second- 
and third-lowest prices of the month. For grant events with the second-lowest price of the month, 
we estimate that 231 (about 13%) were opportunistically timed. For grant events with the third-
lowest price of the month, the estimated number of opportunistically timed events is only 74 
(about 4% of total). Overall, we estimate that, during 1996-2005, there were 1,109 grant events 
that were placed in one of the three lowest prices due to opportunistic timing. These grant events 
comprised 3.9% of all the grant events during the period (4.5% before SOX).  
Table 5 also displays statistics about the magnitude of the discount in exercise price that 
opportunistic timing of grant events could have produced. For the category of lucky grant events, 
the grant price (which was the lowest price of the month) was on average 11% lower than the 
median price of the month. 
Table 6 provides estimates of the number of directors and firms that were on the 
receiving and giving sides in grant events affected by opportunistic timing. Again, our estimation 
methodology is to calculate the difference between actual numbers and the ones expected under 
random assignment. The table indicates that the number of directors with one or more lucky 
grants (5,895) exceeds the number estimated under random assignment by 1,389. The estimated 
number of directors receiving one or more lucky grants due to opportunistic timing comprises 
4.6% of all directors in our sample.  
With respect to firms, the number of those providing one or more lucky grants exceeds 
the estimated number under random assignment by 457. The firms that participated in one or 
more opportunistically timed grant events comprised 7.1% all firms.  
 
D. Backdating or Spring-Loading?  
Deviations from patterns expected under random assignment might be not only due to 
backdating but also due to spring-loading based on private information (e.g., Yermack (1997)). 
Having found that many lucky grants owe their presence in this category to opportunistic timing, 
we turn to examine the possibility that such timing was largely driven by spring-loading rather 
than backdating. To examine this possibility, we perform two tests similar to those performed for 
lucky CEO grants in Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2006). In our first test, we focus on grant 
events in months in which the difference between the lowest and second-lowest prices of the 
month was very small. In such cases, it is implausible that insiders would view one price level as 
15 reflecting significant under-valuation but not the other. Accordingly, in such cases, the spring-
loading hypothesis would not predict a significant difference in the odds of being selected 
between days with the lowest and the second-lowest price of the month. In contrast, in the event 
of backdating that looks back and selects the best price available, a small difference between the 
lowest and second-lowest prices can still be expected to produce a big difference in the odds of 
being selected.  
We therefore pick from our database only grant events falling in a month in which the 
difference between the lowest and second-lowest prices is less than 1%. About half of the grant 
events fall into this category. We then run the following regression: 
 
Is_Grantit =a0 + a1* Dummy_lowest_priceit+ a2* Dummy_second_lowest_priceit            (3) 
 
Panel A of Table 7 (column 1) shows the results of regression (3). The coefficients a1 
and a2 are both positive and statistically significant. However, the coefficient a1 is significantly 
larger than the coefficient a2. The a1 coefficient is 0.326 and the a2 coefficient is 0.163, and the 
difference between the coefficients is significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the odds that the 
grant is given at the lowest price of the month are exp(0.326)=1.39 times higher than they are 
given on other days, while the odds that the grant is given at the second-lowest price of the 
month are only exp(0.163)=1.18 times higher. This result is consistent with the view that 
backdating played a significant role in producing the abnormal incidence of lucky grant events.  
Column 2 shows the results of re-running regression (3) after excluding grant events that 
coincided with the annual meeting. The coefficients increase in magnitude, with the gap between 
the selection odds of days with the lowest and second-lowest price increasing somewhat.  
Columns 3-4 are similar to columns 1-2, except that the sample consists of only the grant 
events that fell in either the lowest or the second-lowest price of the month, and the regression 
has only the lowest-price dummy variable. The coefficient of the lower-price dummy in column 
3 is 0.163 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient increases a bit 
(remaining significant at 1%) when grant events coinciding with the annual meeting are 
excluded. These results reinforce the conclusion that the selection of dates is biased in favor of 
the lowest price of the month over the second-lowest price of the month even when the 
difference between the two prices is below 1%.  
16 Our second test for whether the abnormally high incidence of lucky grant events was 
generally driven by spring-loading is based on when the company reported the grant event to the 
SEC.
14 Under the spring-loading hypothesis, grant event dates are chosen on the basis of the 
private information insiders have at the time of making the selection. Thus, under this 
hypothesis, the odds of a lucky grant are not expected to depend on how long after the grant 
event reporting occurred. In contrast, if grant events were produced by look-back backdating, 
then reporting the grant event in the subsequent month (or later) would facilitate the selection of 
the lowest price of the month as the grant event price.  
To study this issue, we introduce two dummy variables: (i) Reported_same_month, 
which equals one if the filing with the SEC occurs in the same month as the grant and zero 
otherwise; and (ii) Reported_next_month, which equals one if the filing date is in the month 
following the grant month or later. About 33% of the grants in our sample were filed in the same 
month as the grant month. (75% of those after SOX and 6% of those preceding SOX.) We then 
run the following regression: 
 
Is_Grantit =a0 + a1* Dummy_lowest_priceit * Reported_same_month  
+ a2* Dummy_lowest_priceit * Reported_next_month +            (4) 
+eit
 
Under the spring-loading hypothesis, the filing month is expected to be irrelevant, and no 
difference is thus expected between the coefficients a1 and a2.  
Panel B of Table 7 reports the results of regression (4). The coefficient of a2 is larger 
than the coefficient of a1 by 0.239, and a t-test rejects the null that the two coefficients are the 
same. The odds of the day with the lowest price of the month being selected for the date of the 
grant event are significantly higher when the grant is reported after the month ends, which is 
consistent with backdating playing a significant role in producing lucky grant events.  
The third column shows the same regression for the subsample of post-SOX grant events 
only. As noted, during the post-SOX period, some firms have not complied with the two-day 
reporting requirement and a significant fraction of firms continued to report a grant in the month 
                                                 
14 Heron and Lie (2006a) and Narayanan and Seyhun (2006b) analyze how the pre- and post-grant returns 
accompanying grants have been influenced by when the company reported the grant.    
17 following it. Again, consistent with backdating playing a significant role in the opportunistic 
timing of grant events, we find that lucky grant events are more likely to be lucky in the post-
SOX period if the grant event was reported in the next month rather than in the same month.  
 
IV. THE DETERMINANTS OF LUCK 
 
Our analysis thus far has identified a significant incidence of opportunistic timing grant 
events with low price ranks, especially among lucky grant events at monthly lows. Because a 
significant fraction of lucky grant events owe their status to opportunistic timing, lucky grant 
events provide a useful tool for studying the factors likely to be associated with such timing. We 
now turn to pursuing this inquiry.  
 
A. Univariate Statistics  
Table 8 displays univariate statistics. Panel A shows differences between grant events 
that were lucky and grant events that were not, and Panel B shows differences in the incidence of 
lucky grant events among various groups of grant events.   
The figures in the table suggest that lucky grant events were more frequent:   
• in months in which the difference between the lowest and the median price of the month was 
higher; 
• before SOX was adopted;  
• in smaller firms;  
• when executives, and especially the CEO, also received a grant at the same time; 
• when the number of directors participating in the event was small;  
• when the firm had more entrenching provisions (higher level of the entrenchment index); 
• when the board did not have a majority of independent directors; 
• when a preceding grant event was lucky as well; and   
• when insiders’ ownership stake is large. 
We shall discuss the relations between lucky grant events and each of these variables in 




B. Grant Circumstances and Firm Characteristics 
Turning to multivariate regressions, we begin with factors for which Thomson and CRSP 
have all the necessary information and we are thus able to conduct tests based on our grant 
dataset as a whole. These factors are firm size, stock price volatility during the grant event 
month, new economy classification, and whether the grant event took place before or after SOX.  
We exclude here as well as in subsequent regressions grant events coinciding with the annual 
meeting, which we found not to have favorable timing.  
Our multivariate regressions have the following general specification:  
 
Luckyit = [FIRM CHARACTERISTICSit] + [GRANT CHARACTERISTICSit]  (5)   + 
SOXit + eit
 
Table 9 displays our results. The first two columns are pooled regressions in which we 
cluster the errors by firm to correct for potential correlations across the likelihood of lucky grant 
events among the same firms. The next two columns include firm fixed effects, and the last two 
columns include director fixed effects.  
Size: All the regressions include firms' relative size as an independent variable. Smaller 
firms might have less outside scrutiny and less visibility, making opportunistic timing less likely 
to be detected by outsiders.
15 Our variable for size is the natural log of relative market 
capitalization – defined as the ratio of the market capitalization of the firm at the grant date 
divided by the median market capitalization of all firms that gave a grant during that year. In our 
pooled regressions, the coefficient on firms' relative size is negative but statistically insignificant. 
In the fixed effects regressions, the coefficients on relative size are positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that increases in firms' relative size were accompanied by improvements in 
directors' luck.    
New Economy: The fact that many of the firms that have thus far come under scrutiny are 
new economy firms has led to an impression that backdating has been concentrated among new 
economy firms. Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2006) find that CEO grants, even though far 
                                                 
15 Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2006) find CEO grants are more likely to be lucky when the firm has a 
relatively small size. 
19 from limited to or concentrated in new economy firms, were somewhat more likely in such 
firms. We use a variable that classifies firms into new and old economy firms following the 
definition in Murphy (2003). The coefficient of this variable turns out to be statistically 
insignificant from zero, suggesting that director luck has not been associated with new economy 
classification.  
Gains from Luck: Another independent variable we used is the percentage difference 
between the median price and the lowest price of the month of the grant event (in log). This 
variable is used as a proxy for the potential payoffs from turning a grant that was actually 
awarded on another day during the month into a lucky grant. The coefficient of this variable is 
positive (and significant at the 1% level) in the three regressions in which it is used (see columns 
1, 3, and 5).  
It is worth drawing attention to the fact that the coefficient of the median-lowest 
difference is positive not only in the pooled regression but also in the fixed effect regressions in 
columns 3 and 5. These results indicate that our result regarding this variable in the pooled 
regression of column 1 is not all due to cross-sectional differences, i.e., differences between 
high-volatility and low-volatility firms. For any given firm that gives multiple grants over time, 
grants are more likely to be lucky in months in which the difference between the lowest and the 
median price is relatively large. This association is consistent with opportunistic timing 
reflecting an economic decision determined by its payoffs (and thus more likely to be taken 
when payoffs are high). If opportunistic timing were a practice followed with little thought by 
some firms, we would not expect to find the within-firm variation over time that we observe.  
In the regressions of columns 2, 4, and 6 we use a decomposition of the median-lowest 
difference into a market component and a firm-specific component. In all three regressions, the 
coefficients of both components are positive and significant at 1% significance. These results 
reinforce our conclusions in Section III.D that backdating and not merely spring-loading has 
played a significant role in producing the abnormal concentration of grant events at monthly 
lows. Because insiders can be expected to have an advantage in predicting future firm-specific 
returns but not market-wide movements, the market-specific component is not expected to play a 
significant role under a spring-loading scenario.  
SOX: We use in all the regressions a dummy variable equal to one if the grant was given 
post-SOX to control for the change in reporting requirements. The coefficient of SOX is negative 
20 (at 1% significance), indicating that grant events were less likely to be lucky after the adoption of 
SOX.  
Other Controls:  Even under random selection of dates, a grant would be more likely to 
be lucky when more trading dates in the month had a price equal to the lowest price level of the 
month. Also, even when there is only one day with this price level, the probability that it would 
be selected is lower when the month has more trading days. We therefore add two additional 
control variables. The first equals the number of trading days in the month of the grant, and the 
second equals the number of closing prices during the month equal to the lowest price of the 
month.   
 
C. The Relation between Directors' and Executives' Luck 
We now turn to the question of whether and how the odds of a director being lucky 
depended on who else (if anyone) got options at the same time as the director. Out of our sample 
of director grant events, in 71% of the cases (20,683 events) directors alone received options on 
that day and in 29% of the cases one or more executives also received a grant on the same date – 
the CEO alone in 2% of all grant events (594 events), the CEO and one or more other executives 
in 12% of all grant events (1,784 events), and one or more non-CEO executives in 15% of all the 
grant events (4,721 events).  
We re-run the basic regression of Table 9, column 1 – a regression on whether a grant 
event was lucky on various explanatory variables -- adding dummy variables for: (i) whether the 
CEO but not other executives received a grant on that date, (ii) whether the CEO and one or 
more other executives got a grant on that date, and (iii) whether one or more other executives but 
not the CEO received a grant on that date. We present the results in column 1 of Table 10, panel 
A.  
The coefficients of all three dummy variables are positive and significant at the 1% level, 
indicating that the odds that a grant event will be lucky increases when an executive is also 
getting a grant on the same day. A t-test shows that being with the CEO (whether or not another 
executive is also getting options) improves the odds of being lucky by more than being together 
only with one or more non-CEO executives. Thus, a director's interest in a grant event being 
lucky was more likely to be served when an executive, and especially the most important 
executive, also had a personal stake in such an outcome.  
21 In columns 2 and 3 of panel A we add as variables the number of directors participating 
in the grant event and a dummy variable for whether four or more directors participated, 
respectively. In both cases, the results indicate that lucky grant events were associated (at the 1% 
significance level) with a smaller number of participating directors.  It might be that a larger 
number of directors was more common in scheduled grants (recall that we have been unable to 
exclude all grant events that were scheduled). Or it might be that opportunistically timed grants 
were given to directors selectively – that is, to only few directors in each lucky grant event 
produced by such timing.  
Our finding that grant events coinciding with grants to executives were more likely to be 
lucky than other grant events raises the question as to whether our earlier finding of abnormal 
concentration of grant events at monthly low was fully driven by grant events coinciding with 
executive grants. To explore this question, we re-run a regression similar to the ones displayed in 
Table 4 but restrict the sample to grant events not coinciding with grants to executives. 
Specifically, we run a regression of whether a day will be selected for the grant event on whether 
the day has the lowest price of the month.  
In Table 10, panel B, we find that the coefficient of having the lowest price of the month 
is positive, which indicates that the abnormal tendency of monthly lows to be selected for grant 
events is there also for grant events not coinciding with grants to executives. Column 2 indicates 
that this abnormal tendency existed not only prior to SOX but also, though to a lesser extent, 
after the adoption of SOX. In column 3 we run the regression including all grant events again 
and add dummy variables for grant events where the directors alone receive a grant, the directors 
receive a grant along with a non-CEO executive, and the directors receive a grant along with the 
CEO. The regression confirms that director grant events not coinciding with executive grants are 
still more likely to fall on a day with the lowest price of the month (though less likely to do so 
than a grant event coinciding with executive awards).  
Having found that some of the 71% of grant events that did not coincide with grants to 
executives have been opportunistically timed, we proceed to examine whether and how the 
tendency of such grant events to be lucky was correlated with the executives' luck. It is possible 
that circumstances leading to opportunistic timing of executives’ grants also led to opportunistic 
timing of directors’ grants even when they did not coincide with executive grants. We test this 
possibility in Table 10 panel C.  
22 The table shows results of regressions using all grant events that did not coincide with 
executive grants. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether the grant event was 
lucky, and the independent variable of interest is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO was 
given a lucky grant in the year of the grant event or the preceding year. We also include our 
standard controls. The results (see column 1) indicate that a lucky grant event for directors was 
positively correlated (at the 1% level) with CEO luck during the current or prior year.  
 Column 2 repeats the regression in column 1 except that firm fixed effects are added. 
With firm fixed effects, the test focuses on within-firm variation over time between periods in 
which the CEO was and was not lucky. We find that, even after controlling for firm fixed effects, 
director luck was positively correlated (though only at the 10% significance) with CEO luck. 
This finding, like the earlier findings in this section, is consistent with the view that directors' 
luck and executives' luck have been closely linked. 
 
D. Governance  
We now turn to examine the association between director luck and firms' governance 
arrangements and characteristics. To the extent that the opportunistic timing of directors’ grants 
reflects agency problems between outside directors and shareholders, the existence and 
magnitude of such agency problems might depend on various governance dimensions.  
For the analysis in this section, we use data about governance, director, and board 
variables from the ExecuComp and the IRRC datasets, and doing so reduces the size of our 
sample of grant events. We begin with the regression specification in (5) and we add to it 
governance variables in four steps, with each step adding some variables and thereby reducing 
sample size. The results of the four regressions are displayed in Table 11.  
The results in column 1 suggest that not having a majority of independent directors on the 
board is correlated with increased odds of a grant event being lucky at the 5% significance level. 
This result holds in all subsequent regressions at the 1% significance level. The result might 
suggest that lack of board independence might not only be associated with reduced power of the 
outside directors vis-à-vis executives, but might also be associated with increased agency costs 
between the outside directors and shareholders. This result is consistent with the finding in 
Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2006) that CEO luck is correlated with lack of a majority of 
independent directors on the board.  
23  In terms of other aspects of board composition and structure, the likelihood of a grant 
event being lucky increases when there are more executives on the board (significant at the 10% 
level); this result holds at the 5% or 10% level in the three subsequent regressions. The 
coefficient of board size (the number of directors on the board) is negative and significant at 10% 
level, and it remains negative and significant (at 5% or 10% significance) at each of the 
subsequent three regressions. The coefficient on the board being busy (following Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker, (1999), we define a board as busy if the firm's directors have on average 
two or more directorships) is negative but statistically insignificant throughout.  
As to CEO characteristics, the likelihood of a grant event being lucky increases (at 5% 
significance) when the CEO has been in place for more years, and the coefficient of CEO tenure 
remains positive (though significant at only the 10% level) in the following regressions. This 
result is consistent with the finding in Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2006) that CEO luck is 
correlated with CEO tenure. It might be that directors are more careful and hesitant about 
opportunistic timing when the CEO is relatively new. The coefficient of the CEO also being the 
chair is positive but insignificant in all regressions, and the coefficient of the CEO also being the 
founder is negative but insignificant in all the regressions.  
The total ownership stake held by insiders is also relevant. The coefficient of the insider's 
ownership stake is positive at the 1% significance level throughout, and the coefficient of the 
squared variable is negative at the 1% significance level throughout. Thus, increases in inside 
ownership have a positive effect on the odds of director luck initially, but begin to have a 
positive effect beyond a certain point (about 15% ownership stake).  
The second column is similar to the first column except that we add to the regression the 
firm's level of entrenchment as measured by the entrenchment index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2004). This index is based on six provisions that operate to protect insiders from the risk 
of being removed. We use a high Entrenchment Index dummy which equals one if the 
Entrenchment Index exceeds two (implying that the firm has three or more entrenching 
provisions) and zero otherwise. The results suggest that the odds of a grant event being lucky are 
higher – at the 1% significance level – when the firm's entrenchment index level exceeds two, as 
is the case for roughly half of the firms. This result continues to hold at the 1% significance level 
in the subsequent two regressions.  
24 Column 3 adds the fractional ownership by public pension funds. There are suggestions 
in the literature that larger ownership by such funds is associated with some improved 
governance or decisions in some areas (e.g., Qiu (2006), Del Guercio and Hawkins, (1999)).  
Consistent with this work, we find that the odds of a grant event being lucky are negatively 
correlated with the fraction of shares owned by public pension funds. 
Column 4 adds dummies for whether the audit, compensation, and nomination 
committees are independent, variables for which we have information only for part of the period. 
None of the coefficients of these variables is statistically significant while the coefficient on the 
independence of the board as a whole remains significant at the 1% level. This finding suggests 
that having an independent compensation committee is not going to have much of an impact as 
long as the board electing the committee does not have a majority of independent directors. 
 
E. Serial Luck  
The preceding subsections have identified a number of variables that are correlated with 
lucky grants. There are likely to be other firm traits that affect the incidence of opportunistic 
timing but were not included in our regressions. To the extent that such traits do exist, one would 
expect luck to be "serial" or "persistent". That is, controlling for all the variables thus far used, 
one would expect a grant event to be more likely to be lucky if a preceding grant was lucky. 
Such persistence would not be expected, of course, under random selection. 
To examine the existence and magnitude of such persistence, we re-run the regressions in 
Tables 9 and 11, but this time add two dummy variables. One dummy variable is equal to one 
when the firm had a preceding grant event for directors (in our dataset) and it was lucky. The 
other dummy variable is equal to one if the firm has a preceding grant in our dataset and it was 
not lucky. (Our default is therefore grant events that were not preceded in our dataset by another 
grant.)  
Table 12 displays the results of three key regressions with the two dummy variables 
added to them. In all three regressions, the coefficient of the previous lucky dummy is positive 
and significant at the 1% level (10% level with the smaller sample where we require IRRC data 
to be available). The coefficient is on the order of 0.3, which implies that having a preceding 
grant event that was lucky increases the odds of a current grant event being lucky by 35% 
(relative to grant event for which we have no information as to whether a preceding grant event 
25 existed or was lucky). In contrast, the coefficient on the dummy for having a preceding grant that 
was not lucky (which lumps together all other price ranks, including preceding grants at the 
second-lowest price of the month) is negative and statistically significant in the first two 
regressions.  
Thus, the results in Table 12 indicate that there are additional factors making lucky grants 
events more likely beyond those identified in the preceding subsections. Identifying such 
additional factors might be a worthwhile task for future research. 
 
F. Director Luck Around the Economy  
Because most of the backdating cases that have thus far been uncovered involve new 
economy firms, there is a widespread impression that the opportunistic timing of executives’ 
grants has been concentrated in the new economy sector (see, e.g., Walker (2006)). We have 
already seen earlier that director luck, however, is not correlated with new economy 
classification when controlling for other variables such as stock price volatility in the month of 
the grant event. We now turn to look beyond the new/old economy division at how opportunistic 
timing has varied across the economy's industries. The thousands of old economy firms that are 
publicly traded span, of course, diverse industries. In this section we analyze the propensity of 
opportunistic timing across the twelve Fama-French Industries.
16  
Table 13 shows the results of our analysis. The table is ordered by the percentage of grant 
events in the industry that are lucky. We find a significant variation in the incidence of lucky 
grants in each of the economy's industries. The highest percentage of lucky grant events is in the 
shops and consumer durables industries (10.4% and 10.3% respectively), and the lowest 
percentage is in utilities and chemicals (4.7% and 6% respectively).  
Table 13 also shows how the twelve industries vary in terms of the estimated incidence of 
firms involved in one or more opportunistically timed grant events. The incidence of such firms 
is highest in the shops and business equipment industries (10% and 9% respectively). The only 
industry in which we do not identify such an incidence is utilities. A relatively low percentage of 
                                                 
16 The industry definitions are obtained from Ken French’s website. We also conducted an analysis of the 
propensity of lucky grants across industries classified on the basis of one-digit SIC codes, and we 
similarly found opportunistic timing to be present in all industries that made significant use of option 
grants (specifically, all industries other than agriculture and public administration).    
26 firms involved in opportunistic timing is present in manufacturing, money, energy, and 
chemicals (4%, 4%, 4%, and 3% respectively).  
The variation across industries that we identify is not necessarily all due to "industry 
effects", say, industry "norms" or "culture."
17  Industry classification might well be correlated 
with factors such as stock price volatility or governance arrangements that we have found to be 
correlated with lucky grants. Thus, to investigate the extent to which the variation across 
industries is due to such factors rather than "pure" industry effects, we re-run the regression 
shown in column 1 of Table 9, adding industry dummy variables using the consumer non-
durables industry as the default group. The last column of Table 13 shows the coefficients on the 
industry dummies in this regression.  
We find that, once we control for the difference between the lowest and median price of 
the month of the grant event and other variables, only the chemicals and utilities industries have 
a probability of a lucky grant event that is different to a statistically significant degree from the 
default group of the consumer non-durables industry. Pair-wise F-tests further suggest that the 
Shops industry has a significantly higher incidence of opportunistic timing than most other 
industries, except for the Consumer Durables, Other, and Business Equipment industries. 
However, no other pairwise test is significant.
18 We thus conclude that opportunistic timing of 
director grants has not been limited to, or concentrated in, any sub-part of the economy, and that 
differences in industry norms and cultures have not been a main factor shaping the distribution of 
such timing across public firms.  
 
G. Super-Lucky Grant Events 
Having thus far focused on grants awarded at the lowest price of the grant month, we 
conclude by briefly exploring the possibility of opportunistic timing within periods longer than a 
calendar month. In particular, we examine in this subsection two types of lucky grants that were 
"super-lucky" – those having a grant price at the lowest price of the calendar quarter in which the 
                                                 
17 Fleischer (2006) argues that differences in corporate culture and compliance norms were likely a key 
determinant for why some firms but not others engaged in opportunistic timing of executives’ grants.    
18  For the sub-sample where we also have governance data, we also ran a regression (not shown) similar 
to that in Table 11 except that we added the industry dummies. Again, we found that, after controlling for 
governance characteristics, some industry differences remain, but that most industries are not statistically 
distinguishable in terms of the odds of lucky grant events.  
27 grant was reported to have been awarded, and those having a grant price at the lowest price of 
the calendar year in which the grant was reported. 
Figure 2 shows the fraction of grant events at the lowest, second-lowest, and third-lowest 
price of the quarter as well as the highest, second-highest, and third-highest. There is a relatively 
monotonic decrease in the number of incidence of grant event as one moves up the price-rank 
ladder. Table 14, panel A displays statistics concerning the incidence of super-lucky grants. In 
the overall sample period, we find 994 grants (3.8% of all grants) that were super-lucky. Out of 
the set of all lucky grants shown in Table 5, 40% were super-lucky (994 out of 2,473 grants). 
Under random assignment, we would have expected one third of the lucky events to be super 
lucky (one month per quarter). Therefore, super-lucky events happen more frequently than 
expected based upon the lucky grants. Furthermore, comparing the number of actual super-lucky 
grants with the estimated number of such grants, we estimate that 413 super-lucky grants (42% 
of all such grants) were opportunistically timed. The average discount of the exercise price of the 
super-lucky grants compared to the median stock price of the year is around 20%. 
 Table 14, Panel B shows statistics by firms, similar to the ones shown in Table 6 for 
lucky grants. About 13% of the total number of firms (839 firms) gave at least one grant to their 
directors at the lowest price of the quarter. We estimate that 35.3% of these firms (296 firms) 
gave one or more super-lucky grants due to opportunistic timing. These firms represent about 
4.6% of all firms in our sample. 
We repeat the analysis in Table 14, but this time we focus on super lucky grants that were 
granted at the price that was the lowest of the calendar year. We present the results in Table 15. 
In the overall sample period, we find 215 grants (0.8% of all grants) that were super-
lucky annually. Out of the set of lucky grants (see Table 5), 8.7% were super-lucky annually 
(215 out of 2,473 grants). Comparing the number of actual super-lucky grants with the estimated 
number of such grants, we estimate that 113 super-lucky grants (52.5% of all such grants) were 
the product of opportunistic timing. The average discount of the exercise price of the super-lucky 
grants compared to the median stock price of the year is around 39%. 
A total of 197 firms (about 3% of the total number of firms) gave at least one grant to 
directors at the lowest price of the calendar year.  We estimate that about 49.1% of these firms 
(97 firms) gave one or more super-lucky grants due to opportunistic timing. These firms 
represent about 1.5% of all firms in our sample. 
28 VI. CONCLUSION 
 
While prior empirical work and much public attention have focused on the opportunistic 
timing of some executives' option grants, we show in this paper that some outside directors’ 
grants have also been opportunistically timed. We estimate that about 460 firms and 1,400 
outside directors were associated with opportunistically timed lucky grant events. This 
opportunistic timing of outside directors’ grants has been produced to a significant extent by 
backdating and not merely spring-loading based on private information.  
Our results highlight that agency problems might arise not only in the relationship 
between executives and the boards overseeing them but also between outside directors and the 
public investors. The conditions under which outside directors operate, and not merely the 
classification of outside directors as such, can affect how well they perform their critical role. 
Our findings concerning the relations between director luck and governance arrangements can 
help to identify the conditions under which directors can best perform. 
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32 FIGURE 1: THE DISTRIBUTION OF GRANT EVENTS – MONTHLY PRICE RANKS 
 
This figure displays the fraction of grant events that were given on the lowest price of the month (lucky), second, 
and third lowest, as well as third, second, and highest. The numbers are from Table 1, Panel A using the full sample 
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FIGURE 2: THE DISTRIBUTION OF GRANT EVENTS – QUARTERLY PRICE RANKS 
 
This figure displays the fraction of grant events that were given on the lowest price of the quarter (super- lucky), 
second, and third lowest, as well as third, second, and highest. The numbers are from Table 14, Panel A using the 
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TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF LUCK FOR OUTSIDE DIRECTOR GRANTS 
 
The data on option grants are from Thomson for the years 1996-2005. We use a sample of grants to outside directors and report the fraction of grant events given 
at the lowest (second, third) and highest (second, third) price of the calendar month in which the grant(s) were given. We show statistics for a grant event date 
independent of how many directors receive a grant on that date. We call such days, Grant Events. Also reported is the fraction of grant events where the grant day 
price was below versus above the median stock price. The sample consists of 28,764 option grant events. Panel B shows the same statistics for grant events 
where we have IRRC data available on the annual meeting date and that date coincides with the grant event date (+/- 1 day). Panel C shows the statistics for the 
grant events in Panel A that are not in Panel B. Panel D shows statistics for grant events where we do not know the exact annual meeting date (22,670 grant 
events) but we exclude grant events in the months of April and May (66% of the annual meeting dates fall into those two months according to IRRC date). 
 
Panel A: All Grant Events 
 
  Percent of Grant Events At:   
 Total  number 



















Before SOX  17512  10.2%  8.4%  8.3%  6.9%  6.7%  6.4%  49.3%  42.3%  7.0% 
After SOX  11252  7.1%  6.3%  6.2%  4.8%  5.4%  5.1%  50.2%  44.7%  5.4% 
Overall 28764  9.0%  7.6%  7.5%  6.1% 6.2% 5.9% 49.6%  43.2%  6.4% 
 
Panel B: Grant Event Date Known to Coincide With Annual Meeting Date (+/- 1 Day)   
Before SOX  1803  4.6%  5.0%  5.9%  6.8%  5.4%  4.7%  44.7%  49.8%  -5.0% 
After SOX  752  4.0%  4.4%  6.8%  6.3%  4.5%  3.7%  49.3%  46.5%  2.8% 
Overall 2555  4.4%  4.9%  6.1%  6.6%  5.2%  4.4%  46.1%  48.8%  -2.7% 
 
Panel C: Sample Excludes Grant Events Known to Coincide With Annual Meeting Date (+/- 1 Day) 
Before SOX  15709  10.9%  8.8%  8.6%  6.9%  6.8%  6.6%  49.8%  41.4%  8.4% 
After SOX  10500  7.3%  6.4%  6.2%  4.7%  5.5%  5.2%  50.2%  44.6%  5.6% 
Overall 26209  9.4%  7.9%  7.6%  6.0% 6.3% 6.0% 50.0%  42.7%  7.3% 
 
Panel D: Sample Excludes Grant Events in the Months of April and May and Grant Events where Annual Meeting Date is Known 
Before  SOX  9707  12.0%  9.3% 9.0% 7.3% 7.0% 6.8%  50.1%  40.1% 10% 
After  SOX  7120  7.5% 6.7% 6.5% 4.8% 5.4% 5.1%  50.7%  44.0% 7% 
Overall  16827  10.1%  8.2% 7.9% 6.2% 6.3% 6.1%  50.4%  41.8% 9% 36 
TABLE 2: THE DISTRIBUTION OF LUCK FOR OUTSIDE DIRECTORS AND FIRMS 
 
The data on option grants are from Thomson. We use a sample of grants to outside directors and report the number 
of outside directors in panel A, the fraction of outside directors who received at least one grant at the lowest price as 
well as the fraction of outside directors that received at least one grant at the second lowest price whereas this 
outside director did not also receive a grant at the lowest price. Similarly for the highest and second highest price of 
the month. For firms, the unit of observation is the grant event, and statistics are computed at the firm level in a 
similar way to the outside director statistics. The sample consists of 92,253 grants to 32,139 different directors in 
28,764 option grant events by 6,577 different firms between 1996-2005. 
 
 































At least one 
at highest 
1  12864  9.5% 8.0%  17.6%  13.2% 6.6%  6.6% 
2  6835  16.3% 13.6% 29.9% 22.6% 11.5%  11.0% 
3  4298  21.5% 15.8% 37.3% 30.5% 14.1%  16.4% 
4  2686  27.0% 19.7% 46.7% 38.3% 18.2%  20.2% 
5 and more  5456  42.0% 22.1% 64.1% 57.3% 21.7%  35.6% 
All  32139  19.5% 13.6% 33.2% 27.1% 12.2%  14.9% 
          































At least one 
at highest 
1  1658  12.1% 9.8% 21.8%  15.5% 7.4%  8.1% 
2  1087  19.8% 16.2% 36.0% 23.1% 11.8%  11.3% 
3  811  26.9% 16.8% 43.6% 32.2% 15.9%  16.3% 
4  611  32.2% 19.8% 52.0% 36.8% 19.1%  17.7% 
5 and more  2410  45.6% 22.2% 67.8% 59.4% 22.9%  36.5% 
All  6577  29.3% 17.2% 46.5% 36.9% 15.9%  20.9% 
 37 
TABLE 3: LIKELIHOOD OF A DAY BEING SELECTED AS A GRANT DATE  
 
For each firm that granted options to outside directors, the sample consists of all dates during the month where the options were granted. The dependent variable, 
is a dummy variable which equals one if the firm had a grant event to outside directors on that particular date and zero otherwise. Grant events Before SOX are 
ones whose grant date is before September 1, 2002, and grants After SOX are ones whose grant data are on or after September 1, 2002. Three lowest prices of the 
month is a dummy variable equal to one if the grant-date price was one of the three lowest prices of the month, and zero otherwise. *, **, *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics of the coefficients, based on robust standard errors and 
adjusted for clustering at the firm level.  The sample for each of the regressions either includes or excludes months where the grant event falls on the day (+/-1 
day) of the annual meeting. The last two regressions include only months where the grant was given on the day (+/- 1 day) of the annual meeting. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Three lowest prices of month  0.290  0.319      -0.084   
  (18.98)*** (20.15)***     (1.47)   
Three  lowest  *  Before  SOX    0.308  0.343   -0.128 
    (18.17)***  (19.65)***   (1.99)** 
Three lowest * After SOX      0.253  0.269    0.035 
    (10.97)***  (11.27)***   (0.36) 
Constant  -3.042 -3.048 -3.042 -3.048 -2.984 -2.984 
  (800.07)*** (747.00)*** (800.07)*** (747.00)*** (328.96)*** (328.96)*** 
 
Observations on Meeting:  Included  Excluded Included  Excluded Only  if  Only  if  
 
Observations  571830 519328 571830 519328 52502  52502 
 
  TABLE 4:  PRECISE RANK AND  
THE LIKELIHOOD OF SELECTION AS A GRANT DATE  
 
The regression is similar to the regression in Table 3, except that the independent variables are dummies for whether the price on 
the grant event date was the lowest, 2
nd lowest, 3
rd lowest, etc. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics of the coefficients, estimated using robust standard 
errors that are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. Coefficients in regression 3 and 4 are reported with an interaction variable 
between the price-rank and either a Before SOX or After SOX dummy variable. Regression 1 and 3 use all events, regression 2 




 (1)  (2)      (3)  (4) 
Lowest  0.514  0.565    Lowest * Before SOX   0.572  0.631 
 (20.77)***  (22.23)***      (19.74)***  (21.27)*** 
2nd lowest  0.228  0.259    2nd lowest* Before SOX  0.234  0.267 
 (9.57)***  (10.49)***      (8.34)***  (9.22)*** 
3rd lowest  0.152  0.162    3rd lowest* Before SOX  0.142  0.161 
 (6.38)***  (6.55)***      (5.17)***  (5.65)*** 
4th lowest  0.059  0.069    4th lowest* Before SOX  0.041  0.05 
 (2.37)**  (2.64)***      (1.38)  (1.63) 
5th lowest  0.04  0.053    5th lowest * Before SOX  0.025  0.038 
 (1.60)  (2.04)**      (0.85)  (1.25) 
Constant  -3.051  -3.059    Lowest * After SOX   0.392  0.429 
 (601.36)***  (563.24)***      (10.40)***  (11.14)*** 
Observations  571830  519328    2nd lowest* After SOX  0.217  0.241 
         (5.39)***  (5.81)*** 
        3rd lowest* After SOX  0.172  0.163 
         (4.17)***  (3.79)*** 
        4th lowest* After SOX  0.098  0.107 
         (2.40)**  (2.54)** 
        5th lowest * After SOX  0.071  0.082 
         (1.70)*  (1.91)* 
       Constant  -3.051  -3.059 
        (601.36)*** (563.24)*** 
      Observations  571830  519328 
38 TABLE 5: ESTIMATING THE INCIDENCE OF OPPORTUNISTIC TIMING  
 
The table shows an estimate of the number of grant-date prices that should fall on the lowest price of the month, 
second lowest, third lowest as well as the three lowest, if the grant date was randomly selected. We estimate the 
probability of observing a grant event on a particular price-rank day by counting the number of days in the month 
where the price is at a given price-rank and divide it by the total number of trading days of the stock in that month. 
The table compares the estimate to the actual number of grant events that fall into these ranks. We also show the 
average ratio of the exercise price to the median stock price in the month. Grant events Before SOX are ones whose 
grant event date is before September 1, 2002, and grants after SOX are ones whose grant event date is on or after 
September 1, 2002. The sample consists of 26,209 option grant events between 1996-2005 after excluding events 
that are given on the annual meeting date (+/-1 day). 
 
Lucky 2
nd 3rd Three   
 (lowest)   Lowest   lowest   lowest 
Before SOX (Observations 15709)   
Actual Number of Grant Events  1707  1386  1350  4443 
Expected  Number  of  Grant  Events  1098 1236 1315 3649 
Actual-Expected 609  150  35  794 
(Actual-Expected)/Expected 55.5%  12.1%  2.7%  21.8% 
(Actual-Expected)/Actual  35.7% 10.8%  2.6%  17.9% 
(Actual-Expected)/Total  3.5% 0.9% 0.2% 4.5% 
Exercise  Price/Median  Stock  Price  0.88 0.92 0.95 0.91 
      
After SOX (Observations 10500)   
Actual Number of Grant Events  766  672  646  2084 
Expected Number of Grant Events  571  591  607  1769 
Actual-Expected 195  81  39  315 
(Actual-Expected)/Expected 34.1%  13.6%  6.4%  17.8% 
(Actual-Expected)/Actual  25.4% 12.0%  6.0%  15.1% 
(Actual-Expected)/Total  1.7% 0.7% 0.3% 2.8% 
Exercise  Price/Median  Stock  Price  0.91 0.93 0.94 0.93 
      
Overall (Observations 26209)   
Actual Number of Grant Events  2473  2058  1996  6527 
Expected  Number  of  Grant  Events  1669 1827 1922 5418 
Actual-Expected  804 231  74 1109 
(Actual-Expected)/Expected 48.2%  12.6%  3.9%  20.5% 
(Actual-Expected)/Actual  32.5% 11.2%  3.7%  17.0% 
(Actual-Expected)/Total  2.8% 0.8% 0.3% 3.9% 




TABLE 6: ESTIMATING THE INCIDENCE OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS AND  
FIRMS ASSOCIATED WITH OPPORTUNISTIC TIMING  
 
The sample consists of 26,209 option grant events between 1996-2005 after excluding events that are given on the 
annual meeting date (+/-1 day) to 30,483 different outside directors in 6,441 different firms. The table shows the 
number of outside directors (firms) with one to five-and-more grants (grant events) in the sample. The third column 
shows the number of outside directors who receive at least one grant at the lowest price of the month (lucky). The 
forth column shows the expected number of outside directors who receive at least one grant at the lowest price of the 
month. This number is computed in the following way: For outside directors with only one grant, it is the product of 
13,140 (outside directors with only one grant) and the probability of observing the lowest price in the month. This 
probability is equal to the number of days where the price was the lowest price of the month divided by the total 
number of trading days in that month.  For outside directors with more than one grant, the expected number of 
outside directors that receive at least one grant at the lowest price is equal to one minus the probability of having 
each grant not being lucky. This is one minus the product of the probabilities that each individual grant is at the 
lowest price.  A similar calculation is used to estimate the expected number of firms that have at least one grant 


























1 13140  1243  927 316 34.1% 25.4% 2.4% 
2 6670 1113  829 284 34.3% 25.5% 4.3% 
3  3947 918 690 228 33.1% 24.9% 5.8% 
4  2430 701 535 166 31.0% 23.7% 6.8% 
5 and more  4296  1920  1525 395 25.9% 20.6% 9.2% 
All  30483 5895 4506 1389 30.8% 23.6% 4.6% 
        
Distribution of Grant Events by Firm 
Actual # 
Firms  # Grant 















1  1722 207  141  66  47% 32% 3.8% 
2  1146 213  153  60  39% 28% 5.2% 
3  844 224 161  63 39% 28% 7.5% 
4  616 204 143  61 43% 30%  10.0% 
5 and more  2113 1004  797  207  26% 21% 9.8% 
All  6441 1852 1395  457  33% 25% 7.1% 41 
TABLE 7: BACKDATING VS. SPRING-LOADING 
 
The table shows regression results where the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the firm had a grant event on a particular date. The sample consists only 
of months in which the difference between the lowest price and the second-lowest price is less than 1%. The sample for the first and third column regressions 
consists of all dates during the month where the options were granted. The sample for the second and fourth columns excludes grant events on the annual meeting 
date (+/- 1 day). For columns three and four, the sample is limited to the dates in which the lowest price (lucky) or the second lowest price of the month prevails. 
Dummy – lowest and Dummy – second lowest equal one if the price is the lowest price of the month and second-lowest price of the month and zero otherwise. 
Panel B shows coefficients of similar regressions but using the full sample (column 1) or excluding grant events on the annual meeting day (+/-1 day). The 
lowest price of the month dummy (lucky) is interacted with a dummy equal to one if the grant event was reported to the SEC in the same calendar month and a 
dummy equal to one if it was reported in the next or following months. The third column uses only post-SOX grant events excluding events on the annual 
meeting (+/- 1 day). The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics based upon robust standard errors and adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The p-value of 
an F-test is reported in Panel B to test the equality of the lucky*reported the same month and lucky*reported next month coefficients. 
 
Panel A: Lowest vs Second Lowest 
 
Intercept -3.014  ***  -3.020  ***  -2.851  ***  -2.811  *** 
 (702.79)    (642.38)    (77.84)    (73.93)   
Lowest price of the month  0.326  ***  0.384  ***  0.163  ***  0.175  *** 
 (8.34)    (9.48)    (3.09)    (3.20)   
Second-lowest price of the month   0.163  ***  0.209  ***         
   (4.15)    (5.09)            
Observations 229161    202019    27019    24039   
Annual Meeting Events  Included    Excluded   Included    Excluded   
Sample  All  Only Lowest and Second Lowest 
 
Panel B: Reported Same Month vs Reported Next Month 
 
Intercept        -3.013  ***  -3.016  ***  -3.005  *** 
    (1291.84)    (1201.75)    (952.24)   
Lucky*Reported  same  month  0.302 *** 0.335 *** 0.309 *** 
      (7.30)  (7.90)  (6.56)  
Lucky*Reported  next  month  0.541 *** 0.591 *** 0.540 *** 
         (19.88)    (21.21)    (7.99)   
Observations    571830  519328  208402  
p-value of F-test    0.000    0.000    0.000   
Annual Meeting Events  Included    Excluded    Excluded   42 
TABLE 8:  UNIVARIATE STATISTICS 
 
The sample consists of 25,888 option grant events between 1996-2005 after excluding events that are given on the annual 
meeting date (+/-1 day) or for which necessary Compustat or CRSP data are missing. The sample is smaller for grant events 
where we also use IRRC or ExecuComp data.  Panel A shows the number of observations with available data, the unconditional 
mean and standard deviation. The last three columns present the mean of the subsample of lucky grant events, not lucky grant 
events, and the significance of the difference between these two means indicated by ***, **, for 1% and 5%, respectively. Lucky 
grant events are those given at the lowest price of the month; not lucky are all other grant events. Panel B shows the fraction of 
lucky grant events for different groups. Market capitalization is the market value of equity, calculated at the end of the month in 
which the option was granted. Relative size is the market cap of equity divided by the median market cap of firms in the sample 
for that year. Median-Minimum Price Difference is the natural log of the gross return to shareholders from the lowest price of the 
month in which the options were granted to the median price of that month. New Economy are firms that belong to a new 
economy industry, as defined in Murphy (2003). Grants Before SOX are ones whose grant date is before September 1, 2002, and 
grants after SOX are ones whose grant date is on or after September 1, 2002. Previously Lucky is a dummy equal to one if the 
previous grant event of the firm was lucky. At least 4 Directors get Grant in Event is a dummy equal to one if at least four 
directors receive a grant in the grant event, and zero otherwise. Not Independent Board dum is a dummy equal to one if the Board 
consists of a majority of independent directors. Number of Employee Directors is the number of Directors that are also 
employees as identified by ExecuComp. Boardsize is from IRRC. Busy Board dum is equal to one if the average number of other 
directorships the board members hold is bigger than two. CEO tenure is from ExecuComp. CEOChair dum is a dummy equal to 
one if the CEO is also Chairman. Founder CEO is a dummy equal to one if the CEO is classified as the founder of the company. 
We call a CEO the founder if the executive became CEO at least five years before the firm went public. We use the first listing 
year in CRSP as a proxy for the year in which the firm went public. Insider ownership is the stock ownership of insiders based on 
information in ExecuComp. High Entrenchment Index is a dummy equal to one if the Entrenchment Index is >2 and zero 
otherwise. The Entrenchment Index is based on Bebchuk et al. (2004) and takes on values between 0 and 6. For years where the 
IRRC data is not updated, we use lagged values. Fractional ownership by public pension funds is the fraction of ownership by 
public pension funds as reported by Thomson. Independent committee dummies are equal to one if the committees are entirely 
staffed by independent board members. Data is from IRRC, available after 1998. The last four rows show the fraction of events 
where other executives also receive a grant on the same date. 
 
PANEL A: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LUCKY AND NOT LUCKY GRANT EVENTS 
Variables  Obs  Mean  Stddev Lucky Not Lucky Sign of Diff 
Relative Size  25888 -0.068 1.932 -0.397 -0.034 *** 
Median-Minimum Price Difference  25888 0.109 0.094 0.120 0.107 *** 
Neweconomy 25888 0.158 0.365 0.161 0.158   
SOX 25888 0.401 0.490 0.311 0.411  *** 
Previously Lucky  19796 0.093 0.290 0.143 0.088 *** 
At least 4 Directors get Grant in Event  25888 0.351 0.477 0.320 0.354 *** 
Not Independent Board dum  4673 0.245 0.430 0.290 0.241 ** 
Number of Employee Directors  6341 0.438 0.810 0.487 0.433  
Boardsize 4681 9.467 2.951 9.168 9.492  ** 
Busy Board dum  4868 0.045 0.208 0.032 0.046  
CEO Tenure  6071 6.395 6.770 7.055 6.337 ** 
CEOChair dum  4868 0.689 0.463 0.696 0.689  
Founder CEO  6341 0.138 0.345 0.161 0.136  
Insider Ownership  6196 0.039 0.071 0.052 0.037 *** 
High Entrenchment Index  4957 0.444 0.497 0.508 0.438 *** 
Fractional Ownership by Public Pension Funds 4622 2.721 1.889 2.706 2.722  
Indep Compensation Com dum  4681 0.872 0.334 0.868 0.873  
Indep Nominating Com dum  4681 0.803 0.398 0.801 0.803  
Indep Audit Com dum  4681 0.847 0.360 0.846 0.847  
CEO also gets Grant  25888 0.140 0.347 0.207 0.133 *** 
CEO but no other Exec gets Grant  25888 0.016 0.127 0.021 0.016 * 
Other Exec but not CEO gets Grant  25888 0.150 0.357 0.190 0.146 *** 
CEO and other Exec get Grant  25888 0.124 0.329 0.186 0.117 *** TABLE 8 (continued) 
 
 
PANEL B: DIFFERENCES AMONG CATEGORIES OF GRANT EVENTS 
Variable Observations 





Difference  Observations Variable 
Company size below median  14218  10.5%  7.6%  0.00  ***  14546  Company size above median 
High (top quartile) difference 
 between lowest and median price  7191  10.7%  8.5%  0.00  *** 
 
7192 
Low (bottom quartile) difference 
between lowest and median price  
New  Economy  4342  9.4% 8.9% 0.30  24204  Not new economy 
Before SOX  17512  10.2%  7.1%  0.00  ***  11252  After SOX 
Previous Grant Event Lucky  1977  13.3%  7.8%  0.00  ***  20210  Previous Grant Event Not Lucky 
Less than 4 Directors get a Grant in Event  18108  9.6% 8.0% 0.00    ***  10656  At least 4 Directors get a Grant in Event 
Not  Independent  Board  1626  7.8% 6.2% 0.02    **  5252  Independent Board 
Employee Directors on Board  1787  8.3%  8.0%  0.71  4563  No Employee Directors on Board 
Boardsize  <7  582  9.6% 7.4% 0.05  **  4100  Boardsize>6 
Not Busy Board   4648  7.8%  5.4%  0.20  221  Busy Board 
CEO tenure >4  3170  7.5%  8.7%  0.08 *  2910  CEO tenure<5 
CEO is Chair  3355  7.7%  7.5%  0.82  1514  CEO is not Chair 
CEO  is  Founder  874  9.4% 7.9% 0.13  5476  CEO is not Founder 
Insider Ownership >4%  1420  12.0%  6.9%  0.00 ***  4784  Insider Ownership<=4% 
High Entrenchment Index (>2)  2708  8.2%  6.3%  0.00  ***  3197  Low Entrenchment Index (<3) 
Not Independent Compensation Com  598  7.9%  7.6%  0.83  4084  Independent Compensation Com 
Not Independent Nominating Com  921  7.7%  7.6%  0.94  3761  Independent Nominating Com 
Not Independent Audit Com  718  7.7%  7.6%  0.99  3964  Independent Audit Com 
Public Pension Fund Ownership Low  1419  9.5%  7.7%  0.04**  3207  Public Pension Fund Ownership High (>2%) 
CEO also gets a Grant  3815  13.7%  11.4%  0.00  ***  4266  An Exec other than CEO also gets a Grant 
Any Executive also gets a Grant  8081  12.5%  7.6%  0.00  ***  20683  Directors alone receive grants 
CEO gets a lucky grant this or last year – 
but no grant on event day  2035  7.9%  6.9%  0.06  * 
 
9401 
CEO gets a grant that is not lucky this or last 
year – but no grant on event day 
 
43 44 
TABLE 9: THE DETERMINANTS OF BEING LUCKY – A FIRST LOOK 
 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the grant event was on the lowest price of the month (lucky) and zero otherwise. We exclude 
grant events that take place on the annual meeting day (+/- 1 day). The first two regressions are pooled panel regressions. Regressions three and four are firm 
fixed effects regressions. The last two regressions are outside director fixed effects regressions and the sample is based on all grants except for those taking place 
on the annual meeting day (+/- 1 day). Relative size is the natural log of the ratio between the market cap of the firm at the end of the year and the median market 
capitalization of the firms in the sample for that year. Median-Minimum Price Difference is the natural log of the gross return to shareholders from the lowest 
price of the month in which the options were granted  to the median price of that month. This return is winzorized at the 1 and 99 percentile. Market component 
of the Median-Minimum Price Difference is the market return from the minimum-price day to the median-price day. Firm-specific component of the Median-
Minimum Price Difference is the total minus the market return from the minimum-price day to the median-price day. New Economy firms are firms with SIC 
codes as defined in Murphy (2003). Grants Before SOX are ones whose grant date is before September 1, 2002, and grants After SOX are ones whose grant date 
is on or after September 1, 2002. We also control for the fraction of days in the month that have the lowest price (not shown). The numbers in parentheses are the 
t-statistics base on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level (except for the fixed effect regressions). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
 
Pooled Regressions  Firm Fixed Effects 
Outside Director Fixed 
Effect 
Relative size  -0.006 -0.010  0.086**  0.084**  0.051***  0.049*** 
  (0.013) (0.760)  (2.190) (2.140) (3.010)  (2.910) 
New Economy  0.000  0.000       
  (0.065)  (0.010)       
Median-Minimum Price Difference  1.796***   1.678***  1.783***   
  (0.228)   (5.600)  (9.080)   
 3.587***   3.111***   2.333***  Market Component of the  Median-Minimum 
Price Difference   (4.700)   (3.320)   (3.880) 
 1.697***   1.597***   1.747***  Firm-specific Component of the Median-
Minimum Price Difference   (7.280)   (5.240)   (8.740) 
SOX  -0.198*** -0.196***  -0.265*** -0.263*** -0.178***  -0.177*** 
  (0.048) (4.080)  (4.070) (4.030) (4.250)  (4.240) 
Intercept  -1.419***  -1.414***       
  (0.204)  (6.940)       
Observations  25888 25888  25888 25888 79576  79576 
 
 
 TABLE 10: GRANT EVENT PARTICIPANTS AND OUTSIDE DIRECTOR LUCK 
 
PANEL A: OUTSIDE DIRECTOR LUCK AND EXECUTIVE PARTICIPATION  
 
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the grant was given at the lowest price of the month. The 
regressions are firm fixed effects logit regressions. The sample consists of the 25,888 events where outside directors 
get a grant but it excludes grant events that are on the day (+/- 1 day) of the annual meeting. **, *** indicate 
significance at the 5%, 1% level, respectively. T-statistics are shown underneath the coefficients in parentheses. 
CEO But Not Other Exec Get Grant is a dummy equal to one if the CEO but no other executive also received a grant 
on the same day. CEO and Other Exec Get Grant, and Other Exec But Not CEO Get Grant are defined accordingly. 
Number of Outside Directors per Grant Event is the number of outside Directors that receive a grant in the grant 
event. At least 4 Outside Directors Get Grant In Event is a dummy equal to one if at least 4 outside Directors receive 
a grant in the grant event. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
CEO But Not Other Execs Get Grant  0.645  0.645  0.644 
 (2.99)***  (2.99)***  (2.98)*** 
CEO And Other Execs Get Grant  0.632  0.657  0.647 
 (7.48)***  (7.67)***  (7.58)*** 
Other Execs But Not CEO Get Grant  0.336  0.345  0.340 
 (4.26)***  (4.37)***  (4.31)*** 
Number of Outside Directors per Grant Event    -0.024   
   (1.79)*   
At Least 4 Outside Directors Get Grant in Event      -0.079 
    ( 2 . 2 4 ) * *  
SOX  -0.240 -0.229 -0.232 
 (3.66)***  (3.49)***  (3.53)*** 
Relative  size  0.079 0.080 0.079 
  (2.01)** (2.02)** (2.01)** 
Median-Minimum Price Difference  1.573  1.579  1.576 
 (5.21)***  (5.22)***  (5.22)*** 
Observations  25888 25888 25888 
 
45 TABLE 10: GRANT EVENT PARTICIPANTS AND OUTSIDE DIRECTOR LUCK 
(continued) 
 
PANEL B: OUTSIDE DIRECTOR LUCK WITHOUT EXECUTIVE PARTICIPATION  
 
For each firm that granted options, the sample consists of all dates during the month where the option was granted. 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable, which equals one if the firm granted an option on that particular date 
and zero otherwise. Grants Before SOX are ones whose grant date is before September 1, 2002, and grants after 
SOX are ones whose grant date is on or after September 1, 2002. Lucky is a dummy equal to one if the grant event 
day was on the day with the lowest price of the month. *** represents significance at the 1% level. The numbers in 
parentheses are the t-statistics of the coefficients, based on robust standard errors and adjusted for clustering at the 
firm level.  The sample excludes months where the grant event falls on the day (+/-1 day) of the annual meeting. The 
first two regressions also exclude grant event months where other executives receive a grant on the same day as the 
outside directors. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Lucky 0.431     
 (16.47)***     
Lucky *Before SOX    0.485   
   (15.63)***   
Lucky * After SOX    0.322   
   (7.78)***   
Lucky * Directors Alone in Grant Event      0.357 
    (12.51)*** 
Lucky * Directors With Non-CEO Execs      0.359 
    (6.35)*** 
Lucky * Directors with CEO      0.598 
    (10.61)*** 
Constant  -3.009 -3.009 -3.016 
  (1195.46)*** (1195.46)*** (1201.75)*** 
Observations  454649 454649 519328 
46 TABLE 10: GRANT EVENT PARTICIPANTS AND OUTSIDE DIRECTOR LUCK 
(continued) 
 
PANEL C: OUTSIDE DIRECTOR LUCK AND CEO LUCK 
 
The sample consists of grant events excluding those where the date was +/-1 day of the annual meeting and 
excluding grant events where the CEO and/or other executives received a grant. The dependent variable is equal to 
one if the grant event was lucky. The coefficients of logit regressions are shown, using a pooled regression with 
clustering of errors at the firm level (1) and a firm fixed effect regression (2). T-statistics are underneath the 
coefficient estimates. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.  Lucky CEO this or last Year is a 
dummy equal to one if the CEO received at least one lucky grant in  the fiscal year of the event or the year before 
(but did not get a grant on the same day as the outside Directors0.  
 
 (1)  (2) 
Lucky CEO this or last Year  0.286  0.215 
 (2.90)***  (1.69)* 
Relative size  -0.024  0.000 
 (1.41)  (0.00) 
Median-Minimum Price Difference  1.496  1.657 
 (4.92)***  (4.12)*** 
SOX -0.061  -0.065 
 (1.04)  (0.77) 
Constant -1.889   
 (6.63)**   
Observations 18376  18376 
 
 
47 TABLE 11: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND OUTSIDE DIRECTOR LUCK 
 
The table shows logit regressions where the dependent variable is one if the grant was lucky and zero otherwise. The 
sample size is reduced because data from ExecuComp and IRRC are required. Not Independent Board is a dummy 
equal to one if the board does not consist of a majority of independent directors as identified by IRRC. Boardsize is 
the number of directors a company has from IRRC. Number of Exec Directors is the number of directors that are 
executives, and is derived from IRRC. CEO tenure is from ExecuComp. CEOChair dum is equal to one if the CEO 
is also the Chairman. Insider Ownership is from ExecuComp by adding up all stock and option ownership if the top 
five executives for a given year. Busy Board dum is equal to one if the average director of the firm has two or more 
directorships. Founder CEO is a dummy equal to one if the current CEO is the founder. A CEO is designated to be 
the founder if the CEO began service as the CEO at least three years prior to the first listing of the firm on CRSP. 
High Entrenchment Index is a dummy equal to one if the Entrenchment Index of the firm is three or more and zero 
otherwise. Entrenchment Index consists of six anti-takeover provisions and is computed according to Bebchuk, 
Cohen and Ferrell (2004). Fractional ownership by public pension funds is from the 13f filings. Independent audit, 
compensation and nomination committee, are dummies equal to one if all of the committee members are 
independent.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Not  Independent  Board  0.206 0.285 0.288 0.316 
  (2.05)** (2.61)***  (2.56)** (2.73)*** 
Numb  of  Exec  Directors  0.117 0.149 0.144 0.138 
  (1.89)*  (2.31)** (2.01)** (1.95)* 
Boardsize  -0.039 -0.068 -0.060 -0.058 
  (1.77)*  (2.55)** (2.02)** (1.95)* 
Busy  Board  dum  -0.399 -0.397 -0.258 -0.256 
  (1.30) (1.28) (0.82) (0.81) 
CEO  tenure  0.016 0.015 0.016 0.016 
  (2.05)**  (1.73)* (1.68)* (1.69)* 
CEOChair  dum  0.034 0.039 0.053 0.044 
  (0.29) (0.29) (0.36) (0.30) 
Founder  CEO  -0.139 -0.046 -0.022 -0.031 
  (0.88) (0.25) (0.11) (0.15) 
Insider  Ownership  6.231 7.192 8.518 8.448 
  (2.79)*** (2.99)*** (3.03)*** (3.00)*** 
Insider  Ownership2  -19.806 -20.873 -24.065 -23.893 
  (2.67)*** (2.69)*** (2.65)*** (2.62)*** 
High Entrenchment Index    0.478  0.416  0.414 
    (4.08)*** (3.14)*** (3.12)*** 
Fractional Ownership by      -0.053  -0.053 
   Public Pension Funds      (1.74)*  (1.75)* 
Independent Compensation Com dum        0.132 
     ( 0 . 6 4 )  
Independent Nominating Com dum        0.027 
     ( 0 . 1 6 )  
Independent Audit Com dum        -0.013 
     ( 0 . 0 7 )  
Relative  size  0.038 0.054 0.043 0.041 
  (1.01) (1.27) (0.93) (0.88) 
Median-Minimum  Price  Difference  2.256 2.682 2.278 2.284 
  (3.58)*** (4.18)*** (3.24)*** (3.25)*** 
SOX  0.068 0.010 0.056 0.056 
  (0.60) (0.08) (0.37) (0.37) 
Constant  -3.301 -3.296 -3.213 -3.337 
  (11.80)*** (10.12)*** (8.89)***  (8.35)*** 
Observations  6418 5895 4581 4581 
48 49 
TABLE 12: SERIAL LUCK 
 
The table shows logit regressions where the dependent variable is one if the grant was lucky and zero otherwise. The 
sample size is reduced because data from ExecuComp and IRRC are required. Previous Grant Event Lucky is equal 
to one if the previous grant was given at the lowest price. Previous Grant not Lucky is equal to one if the previous 
grant was given at any other price than the lowest price of the month. The hold out group is those events without a 
prior grant. All other variables are described in Table 11. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Previous Grant Event Lucky  0.289  0.325  0.397 
 (3.55)***  (3.89)***  (1.77)* 
Previous Grant Event Not Lucky  -0.218  -0.151  -0.196 
 (4.37)***  (2.90)***  (1.23) 
Not  Independent  Board    0.308 
    (2.71)*** 
Numb of Exec Directors      0.139 
    ( 2 . 0 2 ) * *  
Busy Board dum      -0.261 
    ( 0 . 8 4 )  
Boardsize    -0.058 
    ( 1 . 9 9 ) * *  
CEO  tenure    0.015 
    (1.70)* 
CEOChair  dum    0.031 
    ( 0 . 2 2 )  
Founder  CEO    -0.036 
    ( 0 . 1 9 )  
Insider  Ownership    8.129 
    (3.00)*** 
Insider  Ownership2    -22.832 
    (2.60)*** 
High Entrenchment Index      0.409 
    (3.18)*** 
Fractional Ownership by      -0.055 
  Public Pension Funds      (1.75)* 
Independent Audit Com dum      -0.020 
    ( 0 . 1 1 )  
Independent Compensation Com dum      0.123 
    ( 0 . 6 2 )  
Independent Nominating Com dum      0.018 
    ( 0 . 1 1 )  
Relative size    -0.023  0.041 
   (1.77)*  (0.91) 
Median-Minimum Price Difference    1.581  2.241 
   (6.99)***  (3.21)*** 
SOX   -0.185  0.077 
   (3.82)***  (0.51) 
Constant  -2.691 -2.858 -3.170 
  (50.22)*** (43.77)*** (7.51)*** 
Observations  25888 25888 4581 
 
 TABLE 13: OUTSIDE DIRECTOR LUCK AROUND THE ECONOMY 
 
The table shows statistics by industries. Industries are defined as the 12 Fama-French industries. For each industry the table reports, the number of firms, the 
number of grant events, the fraction of grant events at the lowest price (lucky), and the fraction of firms that unexpectedly granted options at the lowest price of 
the month. For firms with only one grant event the estimated number of grant events is the product of the number of firms with only one grant event and the 
probability of observing the lowest price in the month. This probability is equal to the number of days where the price was the lowest price of the month divided 
by the total number of trading days in that month.  For firms with more than one grant event, the expected number of firms that have at least one grant event at 
the lowest price is equal to one minus the probability of having each grant event not being lucky. The latter is one minus the product of the probabilities that each 
individual grant event is at the lowest price of the month. The last column contains the regression coefficients on industry dummies. The holdout industry is the 
consumer Non-Durables industry (The first Fama-French Industry). The regression run corresponds to the first regression in Table 9 where the Fama-French 
industry dummies are added.  * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 















Shops: Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, Repair Shops)  656  2923  10.4% 10%  0.162 
Consumer Durables: Cars, TV's, Furniture, Household Appliances  144  623  10.3% 6%  0.154 
Other: Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans, Hotels, Bus Serv, Entertainment  809  3376  9.7% 7%  0.045 
Business Equipment: Computers, Software, and Electronic Equipment  1593  7318  9.3% 9%  0.036 
Consumer Non-Durables: Food, Tobacco, Textiles, Apparel, Leather, Toys  290  1270  9.1% 5%   
Health: Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs  789  4106  8.8% 7%  0.000 
Telecom: Telephone and Television Transmission  207  821  8.4% 7%  -0.030 
Money: Finance  1155  4281  8.4% 4%  -0.022 
Manufacturing: Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Off Furn, Paper, Com Printing  557  2443  8.1% 4%  -0.086 
Energy:  Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products  189  743  7.5% 4%  -0.127 
Chem: Chemicals and Allied Products  112  517  6.0% 2%  -0.342* 
Utilities 76  343  4.7% 0%  -0.476* 
 
50 TABLE 14:  ESTIMATING THE INCIDENCE OF SUPER-LUCKY GRANTS DUE TO OPPORTUNISTIC TIMING - QUARTER 
 
The table reports the actual and expected number of grant events on a quarterly basis. The expected number of grant events is computed as the number of days with a certain price rank in a 
quarter where a grant was given, divided by the number of trading days in that quarter where the stock actually traded. The reported number is the sum of this ratio by rank.  Exercise 
Price/Median Stock Price is the average of the ratio of the exercise price of the option in a given rank to the median stock price in the quarter of the grant. The sample consists of 26,175 grant 
events to outside directors between 1996-2005, and is taken from Thomson Financial’s insider-transaction database. The sample size is reduced because we require at least one trading day in 
each of the months of the quarter. Grants Before SOX and Grants After SOX are grants whose strike date is before and on or after September 1
st, 2002 respectively. Quarters are defined by 
calendar time. Panel B shows the number of firms with one to five-and-more grant events in the sample. The fourth column shows the expected number of firms who receive at least one 
grant at the lowest price of the quarter (super lucky). This number is computed in the following way: For firms with only one grant event, it is the product of the number of firms with only 
one grant event and the probability of observing the lowest price in the quarter. This probability is equal to the number of days where the price was the lowest price of the quarter divided by 
the total number of trading days in that quarter.  For firms with more than one grant event, the expected number of firms that give at least one grant at the lowest price of the quarter (super 
lucky) is equal to one minus the probability of having each grant not being super lucky. The latter is one minus the product of the probabilities that each individual grant event is at the lowest 
price of the quarter.  
 
 
Panel A: Super-Lucky Grant Event Distribution 
   Before SOX  After SOX  Overall 








Price rank of grant date in the price 
distribution of the grant month:  Lowest lowest lowest  Lowest  lowest lowest Lowest  lowest Lowest 
Actual Number of Grant Events   727  584  566  267  218  245  994  802  811 
Actual/Total Grant Events  4.6%  3.7%  3.6%  2.5%  2.1% 2.3% 3.8% 3.1% 3.1% 
Expected Number of Grant Events  385  460  519  196  206  213  581  666  732 
Actual-Expected 342  124  47  71  12  32  413  136  79 
(Actual-Expected)/Actual 47.0%  21.2%  8.3%  26.7%  5.6%  13.0%  41.5%  16.9%  9.8% 
Exercise Price/Median Stock Price  0.79  0.84  0.85  0.84  0.86  0.87  0.80  0.84  0.86 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution of Grant Events by Firm 
# Grant 
Events Firms 
Actual # Firms at 
Lowest Price  
Expected # of Lucky 
Grant Events  
Actual – Expected
 
(Actual - Expected)  
/ Expected 
(Actual - Expected) 
/ Actual 
(Actual - Expected) 
 / Total 
1  1723  75 51 24  46.3% 31.6% 1.4% 
2  1147  87 59 28  48.0% 32.4% 2.4% 
3  844  103 61  42 70.2% 41.3%  5.0% 
4  616  83 53 30  56.7% 36.2% 4.9% 
>4 2108  491 319 172 53.9%  35.0%  8.2% 
All  6438  839 543 296 54.6%  35.3%  4.6% 
51 TABLE 15: ESTIMATING THE INCIDENCE OF SUPER-LUCKY GRANTS DUE TO OPPORTUNISTIC TIMING - YEAR 
 
The table reports the actual and expected number of grant events on an annual basis. The expected number of grant events is computed as the number of days with a certain price rank in a 
year where a grant was given divided by the number of trading days in that year where the stock actually traded. The reported number is the sum of this ratio by rank.  Exercise Price/Median 
Stock Price is the average of the ratio of the exercise price of the option in a given rank to the median stock price in the year of the grant. The sample consists of 26,025 grant events to 
outside directors between 1996-2005, and is taken from Thomson Financial’s insider-transaction database. The sample size is reduced because we require at least one trading day in each of 
the months of the year. Grants Before SOX and Grants After Sox are grants whose strike date is before and on or after September 1
st, 2002 respectively. Years are defined by calendar time. 
Panel B shows the number of firms with one to five-and-more grant events in the sample. The fourth column shows the expected number of firms who receive at least one grant at the lowest 
price of the year (super lucky – year). This number is computed in the following way: For firms with only one grant event, it is the product of the number of firms with only one grant event 
and the probability of observing the lowest price in the year. This probability is equal to the number of days where the price was the lowest price of the year (super lucky – year) divided by 
the total number of trading days in that year.  For firms with more than one grant event, the expected number of firms that give at least one grant at the lowest price of the year (super lucky- 
year) is equal to one minus the probability of having each grant not being super lucky (year). The latter is one minus the product of the probabilities that each individual grant event is at the 
lowest price of the year.  
 
 
Panel A: Super-Lucky Grant Event Distribution (Year) 
   Before SOX  After SOX  Overall 








Price rank of grant date in the price 
distribution of the grant month:  Lowest lowest lowest  Lowest  lowest lowest Lowest  lowest Lowest 
Actual Number of Grant Events   165  178  195  50  59  83  215  237  278 
Actual/Total Grant Events  1.1%  1.1%  1.2% 0.5% 0.6%  0.8%  0.8%  0.9%  1.1% 
Expected Number of Grant Events  62  111  138  40  53  57  102  164  195 
Actual-Expected 103  67  57  10  6  26  113  73  83 
(Actual-Expected)/Actual 62.5%  37.6%  29.1% 19.4%  9.6%  31.3%  52.5%  30.6%  29.8% 
Exercise Price/Median Stock Price  0.59  0.64  0.65  0.68  0.70  0.71  0.61  0.66  0.67 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution of Grant Events by Firm 
# Grant 
Events Firms 
Actual # Firms at 
Lowest Price  
Expected # of Lucky 
Grant Events  
Actual – Expected
 
(Actual - Expected)  
/ Expected 
(Actual - Expected) 
/ Actual 
(Actual - Expected) 
 / Total 
1  1705  12 7  5  64.2%  39.1% 0.3% 
2  1143  14 9  5  64.2%  39.1% 0.5% 
3  844  21 10 11  118.8%  54.3% 1.4% 
4  616  18 9  9  102.6%  50.7% 1.5% 
>4 2113  132 66  66 99.8% 50.0%  3.1% 
All  6421  197 100  97  96.3%  49.1%  1.5% 
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